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Thucydides observed that, although the Greeks shared a common tongue,
it was their inability to speak to one another that spelled an end to their
democracy.' If we may believe him, there were once those who could speak
Greek so that it was understood not only by both Athenians and Spartans, but
by Thebans and Corinthians too. That must have required not only sensitive
speakers who were skilled dialecticians but also a readiness of their diverse
audiences to discern their intended meanings and refrain from unwarranted
attributions. It may thus have been a cause of the Peloponnesian War that
differences in the nuances placed on common words by auditors from different cities led them to derive different and unintended meanings, meanings
having corrosive effect on the mutual trust they once had shared. While it is
unlikely that the history of the fifth century before Christ would have taken a
different course if the citizens of Athens and Sparta had read the recent book
of Randall Kennedy,- it is instructive to reflect on that possibility.
Public discourse in a multiethnic democracy cannot be conducted in a
single King James or Mandarin tongue. While postmodern literary scholarship encourages readers of diverse ethnicities to find for their "communities"
their own distinctive meanings of literature,3 that is not a satisfactory approach
to democratic law or politics. It is one thing for an interpretive community to
share in isolation their reactions to a work of art-although even that is not
without risks-and quite another for the critics to attend a discussion of public
affairs by persons of different interpretive communities with the intent of
imposing their subcultural meanings on words uttered in the shared language
by a speaker who may be limited by her own subcultural diction or other
impediments to communication. "Listener-centered" legal or political discourse of that kind is not unlikely to become no discourse at all.
Paul D. Carrington is a professor of law at Duke University.
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Incorrect Speech, Inconect Heaing
This point, subtly made by Kennedy, deserves consideration not only by
African-Americans, who are his primary addressees, but also by others who are
as postmodernists prone to impose their politically correct interpretations on
the diction of speakers who may be less correct than themselves. Perhaps
those who advocate more sensitivity training for speakers might consider the
possible additional need for sensitivity training for postmodern listeners. At
least this is so for lawyers who counsel clients about the meaning of legal texts
or engage in dispute resolution in any of its forms. Law students seeking
professional competence need to master, as much as or more than any, the
skill of understanding what writers or speakers are saying, and that depends
heavily on their skill in discerning why they are saying it. For that reason,
Kennedy's point has very broad application for lawyers.
Kenned-y has previously proved himself willing to be politically incorrect,4
and he has now written a book about the most incorrect of all words, one that
supplies his despised title. His aim is moderately to relax the popular obsession with that word. He observes that this worst of all words is on rare
occasions just the right word to say what needs to be said. His work contrasts
with the work of more correct authors who have sought to criminalize the use
of specific words they hear as hate speech, seemingly without regard for the
purpose or context in which the despised words are used by a speaker. Such
audition might be denoted as hate listening, an activity that those preoccupied
with the deterrence of hate speech might contemplate as a suitable additional
object of correction, especially so if they are, or hope to become, competent
lawyers.
As Kennedy records, and readers well know, many African-Americans and a
multitude of others who deplore racial discrimination have made the utterance of the N word by white persons a casus belliwithout regard for the context
or purpose of its use. Kennedy of course acknowledges that the word is often
an insult (who would deny it?), and he offers a striking collection of examples.
He offers no excuses for those using the word as an insult. For an example, he
considers and approves (correctly in my own view) the removal from office of
a public prosecutor who angrily used the N word as an insult while inebriated
and in a barroom brawl with an African-American, on the ground that his
expression, even if provoked, revealed him to be unfit for the office of public
trust that he held."
Kennedy's point, however, is that even the N word is not always an insult,
even when used by white persons, and he cautions auditors and readers to
note the difference between his examples and the numerous counterexamples
he provides of persons and authors employing the word usefully, with no
intent to harm. And while he notes that African-Americans may address one
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another with the word as a means of expressing a common bond, he suggests
that the negative consequences of its use are not wholly lacking when it is used
by black comedians as a form of self-degradation.
The N word, as Kennedy notes, is only the strongest example of a word
assigned notoriety by persons sensitive to insult. Its use as an insult is related to
the institution of slavery in the United States, and it may have acquired its
extraordinary power to offend in the period following the Civil War and the
emancipation. It came to be taken as a suggestion that the person so addressed should be remanded to chains. It has acquired an implication familiar
to allAmericans that persons of dark skin denoted by that term have degraded
traits and characteristics.
Kennedy compares other words that carry similar baggage, but less of it.
Over time, he notes, a word can acquire, or can lose, such baggage. For an
additional example, Hugh Henr , Brackenridge reported in his 1792 novel
that many American women were offended when addressed by the word lady
for its unacceptable connotations of un-American class pretensions. 7 Following Cervantes, Brackenridge thought their overreactions might be related to
the traditions of chivalry still remnant in America in his time. He noted that,
among those given to fighting duels, the smaller the aggravation the greater
the sense of honor manifested by the challenger. Anyone, he observed, could
resent an intentional affront, but to kill (or despise) a man where there was no
such intent showed great sensibility, at least in the tradition of chivalry. So, for
a woman to hate a man for politely addressing her as a lady vindicated her
honor as a patriot, much as a challenge to a duel would vindicate the honor of
her escort if the offender were guilty of making a sexual invitation to her. So
far as Brackenridge reports, women were not prone to take offense at the
mere utterance of the word lady so long as it was not applied to themselves. Yet
the contemporary propensity of some citizens to sense that they have been
insulted by the mere utterance of a proscribed word such as the N word,
regardless of the purpose of the utterance, is one that resonates with the code
duello as Brackenridge describes it.
Not long ago, I had an encounter with another word of assigned notoriety.
I was explaining to a class of law students the facts of a defamation case
brought by a Hollywood actress named Jones against Calder, a journalist in
Florida who wrote in a national publication.8 The question I meant to pose was
whether such a plaintiff might sue her defamer in California, or would have to
go to Florida. What precisely Calder had said about Jones, so long as it was
plausibly defamatory, was not germane to the jurisdictional issue I hoped we
might discuss, so I abbreviated his reportage of her sex life to a syllable,
reporting that he called her a "slut." After class, I was politely told by an
amiable student that my diction was incorrect and marked me as a person
lacking sympathy with the sexual liberation of women. It did not matter that
the word was used not as an insult uttered by the speaker but as an accurate
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summary of an offensive utterance by someone else. The mere utterance of
the syllable was, I was assured, an offense to sensitive women without regard to
purpose or intent.
I do not contend here that persons of Victorian sexual mores are entitled to
advocate them in public, or even in a law school classroom. I do contend that
no other English word would have served my purpose so well, and I therefore
ought not apologize for using it as I did. As I said to my informant, if she
chooses to take offense when it is obvious that none was intended, that is
primarily her problem as an auditor, and not mine as a speaker. If she can
supply me with a one-syllable synonym of slut, I would consider using it to
accommodate her sensitivities.
There are, I acknowledge, other special four-letter words which carry so
much baggage that they are not allowed on network television and perhaps
should not be used in a law school classroom either, even in the presence of
adults, except perhaps on rare occasions when they are needed for the
purpose of saying what needs to be said.
Kennedy's argument that I here endorse as compelling for lawyers is that
auditors have an obligation to consider the context and purpose of an utterance, even of the N word. The morality of our discipline requires that legal
texts be taken to have one meaning without regard to the subcultural identity
of the persons to whom they are applied.' A lawyer reading legal texts as
objects of subcultural interpretation will give his clients a lot of bad legal
advice. Moreover, one who is quick to take personal offense, even at the
misuse of an ugly four-letter word, is unsuited for the roles of advocate,
counselor, or negotiator. If my informant about the postmodern meaning of
slut is seriously interested in preparing herself to the work of a lawyer, she
would do well to learn to deny herself the indulgence of attributing unexpressed and unwelcome intentions and sentiments to a speaker, whether a
teacher or a fellow student, and in due course to control the same urge when
the speaker is a client, an associate, an adversary, ajuror, or ajudge.
It was, indeed, at least arguable that the best thing a law student could
acquire from the traditional case method as employed by many American law
teachers for about a century was the ability to put his own personal vanity and
choice of diction on the shelf while engaged in "thinking like a law yer."10 That,
it seems, was the intellectual and emotional toughness that case-method
teachers Charles Hamilton Houston and William Hastie sought to develop in
their students at the Howard University Law School when their slogan was "no
tea for the feeble, no crape for the dead."" One cannot imagine their student
Thurgood Marshall, for example, expending much intellectual or emotional
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energy at mere tasteless crudities of expression by other lawyers when it was
obvious that no offense was intended, especially when there was a professional
task to be performed. 2 Lawyers concerned with substance worry little over
affect.
Perhaps postmodern law students should value the use by their teachers of
an offending word for an inoffensive purpose as a significant element of their
professional education, affording them an opportunity to divest themselves of
the disabling intellectual habit associated with their postmodernism. If I could
have taught my offended student to make that divestment, I would have
achieved a much more important result than merely informing her of the law
of state courtjurisdiction. 13
Hate words are such, I contend, only when it appears that they are used to
express hate. They may be linked to hate conduct and might then be properly
denoted as hate crime. For example, spray-painting such words on a public
building is far more harmful to the public than spray-painting equally tacky
graffiti. A law student who spray-painted the N word, or even its abbreviation,
on a public sidewalk should be expelled, and in the absence of some extraordinary explanation should have a hard time with a character and fitness
committee. But for those of us who have been making the case for diversity,
among populations of law students, it would be hypocritical to exclude students whose disqualification is that they are less attentive to the sensitivities of
others than the others wish them to be." Even the N word is a word capable of
polite ironic usage and may in some circumstances be the most apt means of
saying what needs to be said.
For example, Kennedy notes that Mark Twain uses it 215 times in Hucklebeny Finn.15 That book could not have been written without the word. Its most
admirable character is referred to by the despised term because he could not
have been credibly referred to in any other way. The story is convincingly told
as the recollections of an ignorant mid-nineteenth-century adolescent who
happened unselfconsciously to record seven distinct dialects reflecting differences of status and locality. That this was an accurate account of how people
living along that river in the middle of the nineteenth century spoke to one
another has not saved the author from recriminations about his use of the
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despised word or kept his book on the shelves of many public libraries.' 6 Nor
has it saved Twain from efforts to suppress his art that, when he was a few
bucks ahead, he paid the tuition of an African-American student at the Yale
Law School, or that the student he helped was later an early mentor to
Thurgood Marshall.17 As Kennedy affirms, it is nonsense to try to suppress his
great work simply because some readers are unable or unwilling to perceive
18
the irony that the lowlyJim, identified as he is by the N word, is Twain's hero.
There are situations aside from the accurate reportage of the expressions
and sentiments of others in which the N word may still be exactly the right
one. Several examples may be found, as Kennedy notes, in the diction of
Lyndon BainesJohnson.'"Johnson of course lived in a different time, and he
was given to crude expressions of all sorts, many of them potentially offensive
to his auditors. Indeed, he was often brutal in his speech. He was, however, a
versatile dialectician, not unlike Twain in his ability to adapt his dialect to his
purpose. That was one of the skills making him famous in his time for his
remarkable ability to manipulate and overbear other legislators. 21 An important feature of his approach in lobbying colleagues was his ability to posture as
a constituent of anyone he needed to persuade. He had mastered this art by
the time he was a young adult,2' for he employed it-often unconsciously I
have no doubt-throughout his political career. His was a talent in that
respect that any lawyer should envy.
Not an example chosen by Kennedy, but one I regard as a Mona Lisa
performance of the dialectician's art, was a conversation between Lyndon
Johnson and George Wallace-a three-hour exchange held on Sunday, March
13, 1965-featuring use of the N word by the president of the United States. It
was summarized by Stephen Lesher, Wallace's biographer, who unsqueamishly
recorded the recollections of Wallace and of Nick Katzenbach and other
presidential aides who were in and out of the room during the three hours
thatJohnson and Wallace were together.2 2 Lesher's summary of the exchange
should hang in the Louvre of political expression even though it was appallingly
incorrect even for 1965 and makes for shocking reading today.
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Wallace was himself no slouch of an artist in the use of dialect. He attributed his own political success as a governor of Alabama who commanded a
national following (exhibited by a standing ovation from initially hostile
Harvard students whom he addressed2") to his ability to "put the hay down
where the goats can get at it." 4 Wallace, it must be noted, seldom if ever used
the N word to describe his African-American constituents, not even when he
was among those white constituents who often used it to degrade their fellow
citizens. Wallace would later renounce the racist politics that had led him to
stand in the schoolhouse door to forestall the desegregation of the University
of Alabama, 5 and he would live to crown its first African-American homecoming queen.
It could be said of Johnson's method that he put the hay down where
Wallace could get at it. In talking to Wallace, as he often had done with racist
senators,Johnson deliberately used dialect marking himself as one of Wallace's
white supremacist constituents. Wallace was staggered by the president's
language. It prevented him from doing what he had come to the White House
to do. Johnson could not have achieved that effect without the N word, much
as it was indispensable to Twain in recording as he did in Huck Finn the
utterances and recollections of an ignorant adolescent Missourian of his time.
Johnson's usage was, I would guess, unconscious instinct derived from what he
knew, or thought that he knew, about Wallace. No doubt the president could
have dealt with a governor in many other ways, but not to the same effect.
The notable conversation was held at the request of Wallace to discuss
recent events in Selma, Alabama. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and other groups had centered efforts to secure voting rights in Selma,
where only two percent of the eligible blacks had been registered to vote,
despite registration efforts that had been underway for several years..2 6 On the
previous Sunday, March 6, there had been a brutal beating by Alabama state
troopers of civil rights marchers seeking to walk along the state highway from
Selma to Montgomery to petition for voting rights for black Alabamians.
Judge Frank Johnson (no relation to Lyndon), who was the federal judge
known as most favorable to civil rights lawyers, 27 had imposed a temporary
restraint on a repetition of the attempted march pending further judicial
consideration by him of the issues presented by the proposed police response.
Wallace publicly insisted that the issue was not voting rights, but the
marchers' defiance of state law regarding demonstrations on state highways
and the resulting endangerment of themselves and others. He asked the
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president for a meeting to negotiate a resolution of the problem and secure
Department of Justice help to influence Judge Johnson if possible, or otherwise to help the Alabama police keep the peace. He planned to alarm the
president about the imminent violence to be expected from supremacist
Alabamians who would not tolerate voters of dark skin pigments. That threatening message could not be borne to a person using the N word as the
president did.
It was an important part of the context of the meeting that Congress had
only recently enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That event was in part a
product of Johnson's talent. It was a comprehensive law, but it was silent on
voting rights, a concession made to gain the required assent of Southern
senators. It appears thatJohnson planned to come back to Congress for voting
rights, but not in 1965. His hand was in some measure forced by the events at
Selma on the previous "Bloody Sunday."
On the governor's arrival in the oval office, President Johnson offered
Wallace a deep, low seat that emphasized the governor's relatively diminutive
stature. The president, a much larger man, pulled up his big rocking chair
and rocked to and fro, suspending his face over that of the governor to
magnify the force of what he was going to say. As Lesher summarizes the
conversation, it went thus:
JOHNSON: George, von see all those demonstrators there in front of the
White House?
WALLACE: Yes, Mr. President, I saw them.
JOHNSON: Those goddam niggers have kept my daughters awake every
night with their screamning and hollering night after night. Wouldn't it bejust
wonderful if we could put an end to all those demonstrations?
WALLACE: Oh, yes, Mr. President, that would be wonderful.
JOHNSON: Then why don't you let the niggers vote?
WALLACE: They can vote if they're registered.
JOHNSON: Well, then, George, why don't youjust tell them county registrars
to register those niggers?
WALLACE: I don't have that power, Mr. President. Under Alabama law,
that belongs to the county registrars.
JOHNSON: George, don't you shit me. Who runs Alabama? Don't shit me
about your persuasive powers. I had on the TV this morning and I saw you
and you were talking and you was attacking me, George.
WALLACE: Not Vot, Mr. President. I was speaking against federal
intervention.
JOHNSON: You was attacking me, George. And you know what? You were
so damned persuasive that I almost changed my mind."
At the end of the three-hour conversation,Johnson, we are told, arose from
his rocker and led (or pulled?) Wallace into the White House Rose Garden for
a press conference. There he stepped in front of cameras and microphones to
announce that he was sending a draft of voting rights legislation to Congress
immediately. Two days later, before an extraordinary joint session of Con-
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gress, he declared in diction marking one of the finest moments in the annals
of American politics: "Their cause must be our cause too. Because it is notjist
Negroes, but really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of
2 '9
bigotry and injustice. And we shall overcome.
His dramatic utterance of the lyric of the hymn most used by King and his
followers was another exhibition of his skill as a dialectician. It brought tears
to the eyes of King as he watched on television." (Mine, too.) And to one of
King's followers, it "suddenly dawned on me that King was no longer the
number one civil rights leader in America, LyndonJohnson was." Had Wallace
stayed with the president any longer, he might have found it necessary to
support federal voting rights legislation. For who was left to support him if a
user of the N word such as Lyndon Johnson would not?
Johnson was not a lawyer. But the kind of skill exemplified by his performance with Governor Wallace and the Reverend King is one that a good
lawyer might be proud to employ in many professional situations, even if it
required the use of politically incorrect diction. The public mission of the
American legal profession is, indeed, to bridge differences of class, of ethnicity,
and of social mores, as well as those of race. Where people as diverse as
Athenians and Spartans share turf, it is ajob for law and lawyers to mediate.
Professionals performing that role can scarcely afford to have thin skins when
others are loose with their diction. Even more, they cannot take offense at the
use of words used to a benign purpose and without intent to give offense.
Kennedy's point that the apparent purpose of an utterance informs its
meaning is worthy of the attention of all those who have imbibed from literary
theorists the idea that meaning is derived from audience response, and who
thus justify their insistence on politically correct speech. Even the N word is
capable of benign use. And lawyers who are quick to take offense at inappropriate diction, without respect for the manifest purpose of a writer or speaker,
perform professional labors of all kinds under a grave handicap.
If this is so, it is an appropriate cause for concern of legal educators. In an
age of consumerism in professional education, there is a risk of becoming too
delicate in respecting the perceived sensitivities of students. Educators who
contribute to the elevation of those sensitivities may be making it harder for
students to learn to attend the sensitivities of others. Thinness of skin and
attentiveness to the fragilities of others are not mutually exclusive traits, but
they are not, in my experience, often manifested in the same person. The
former trait is seldom observed in good lawyers who deal professionally with
all manner of Greeks and administer law that applies equally to all of them.

29.

1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson (1965), 281, 284
(Washington, 1966).

30. Garrow, supra note 27. at 408-09.

